Limits of Quantitative Easing by Marek Dabrowski
 
The opinions expressed in this publication are solely the author’s; they do not necessarily reflect the views of  
CASE - Center for Social and Economic Research, nor any of its partner organizations in the CASE Network.                                        CASE E-Brief Editor: Ewa Błaszczynska 
  CASE Network E-briefs 
 No. 14/2010     November 2010  
 www.case-research.eu 
 
Limits of Quantitative Easing 
By Marek Dabrowski
 
The recent decision of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board (Fed) 
to  increase  its  assets  by  purchasing  $600  billion  worth  of 
Treasury  bonds  is  unlikely  to  boost  economic  growth  or 
employment prospects in the U.S. Instead, it will cause major 
damage  throughout  the  world  economy,  especially  in 
emerging markets, where the U.S. dollar remains a leading 
reserve  and  transaction  currency.  If  this  decision  is  not 
corrected  soon,  the  Fed’s  policy  may  cause  another 
macroeconomic and financial crisis in the very near future.  
A Bit of Recent History 
When examining  the  origins  of  the recent  global  financial 
crisis, one cannot omit the role and responsibility of the U.S. 
Fed. Let’s not forget the Fed’s unjustified fear of deflation in 
the  beginning  of  the  2000s,  which  kept  the  Federal  Fund 
Rate (FFR) at a very low level (1%) for far too long. This led to 
a spike in asset bubbles as well as decreased perceptions of 
risk.  Paradoxically,  when  the  asset  bubbles  burst  and  the 
financial system collapsed in 2007-2008, the Fed responded 
with  increasingly  aggressive  monetary  easing  in  order  to 
avoid a deflationary spiral similar to the kind experienced 
during the 1930s. Generally, this was the correct response 
because the rapidly decreasing money multiplier had to be 
compensated via a much larger volume of reserve money 
(see Figure 1).  
As the FFR dropped to almost zero, further monetary easing 
had to be conducted through the Fed’s purchasing of various 
financial  assets,  the  so-called  quantitative  easing.  Looking 
back, this policy achieved its goals, i.e. shortened the overall 
length of the recession and prevented deeper deflationary 
shocks. However, it reached the limits of its effectiveness. 
Specifically, it cannot be repeated under the new economic 
realities  of  2010-2011  without  a  serious  risk  of  economic 
distortions and turbulences.  
More Money More Problems 
The Fed justifies its new round of quantitative easing (QE2) 
as  upholding  U.S.  domestic  policy  priorities,  specifically 
supporting economic growth and reducing unemployment. 
Its  main  concerns  are  deflation  and  double-dip  recession, 
reminiscent of the 2002-2003 debate. 
At this stage, however, it is doubtful whether additional 
(cheap)  money  can  help  stimulate  the  U.S.  economy. 
Most  borrowers,  especially  households,  face  an 
excessive  debt  burden  as  real  estate  prices  (home 
owners’  main  collateral)  remain  low  and  employment 
perspectives  are  highly  uncertain.  In  this  environment 
interest rate levels really do not matter all that much. To 
put it simply, borrowers are still hesitant to borrow, and 
banks  are  reluctant  to  lend.  Most  probably,  only  a 
fraction  of  the  $600  billion  injection  will  be  absorbed 
domestically  while  the  majority  will  flee  abroad  to 
various emerging markets (see below). 
Ultimately, the monetary stimulus cannot help solve the 
long-term macroeconomic or structural challenges faced 
by the U.S. economy. For example, if the U.S. wants to 
eradicate its high current account deficit than it must 
increase its net savings rate. Monetary easing will not 
help  achieve  this  goal.  The  same  concerns  structural 
changes  such  as  reducing  the  share  of  leveraged 
economic  activity  (like  the  housing  industry).  These 
kinds of changes are socially and politically painful. They 
take time to correct and expansionist monetary policy 
will do little to alleviate the sting. 
 Stimulating Risk Appetite and New Bubbles 
     
    Expansionary  monetary  policy  is  also  unlikely  to  help 
steer  the  financial  sector  towards  more  prudent 
practices. If investors cannot expect a real positive rate 
of  return  on  standard  bank  deposits  they  will  seek 
higher-yield  but  more  risky  financial  instruments.  
Demand for such instruments will have to be met by the 
financial  industry  in  one  way  or  another,  tougher 
regulatory standards notwithstanding.  
Thus, new economic distortions and asset bubbles seem 
to be the unavoidable result of a continued lax monetary 
policy. One can only speculate where they are going to 
appear. True, a new housing bubble in the U.S. does not 
seem to be possible in the near future, but stock and/or  
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commodity bubbles look like a highly probable scenario.  
Exporting Inflationary Pressure 
As mentioned earlier, cheap money will flow from the U.S. to 
other countries in search of higher investment yields. This 
will  cause  a  lot  of  problems  for  the  latter,  especially  for 
developing  market  economies.  Larger  capital  inflows  and 
increasing  commodity  prices  will  generate  overheating  as 
well as inflationary pressures similar to those observed in 
2005-2008.  They  may  also  contribute  to  the  creation  of 
various  local  bubbles,  especially  in  countries  with  weaker 
financial sector regulation.  
Although inflation does not seem to be a real threat in the 
U.S. in the short-term, higher inflation worldwide will have 
to have an impact on U.S. domestic inflation rates over the 
long-term,  among  others,  through  a  commodity  price 
channel.  Furthermore,  the  Fed’s  reduced  credibility  (as  a 
result of its excessive involvement in quasi-fiscal operations 
and deteriorating balance sheets) can increase inflationary 
expectations. This will be a very dangerous moment for the 
entire  global  economy.  The  Fed  will  have  to  tighten  its 
monetary  policy  sharply  and,  as  it  happened  in  the  early 
1980s or mid 1990s, overheated emerging markets will face 
the threat of both currency and debt crisis. 
To cushion the damaging impact of increasing financial inflows 
some  emerging  market  economies  have  already  started  to 
build  a  protective  wall  against  them  by  introducing  various 
types of capital controls, sometimes under the heading of so-
called  macro-prudential  regulations.  However,  in  the 
contemporary  world  of  sophisticated  financial  engineering 
they  can  be  easily  circumvented.  And  as  any  type  of 
protectionism they generate beggar-thy-neighbor policies, i.e. 
they redirect capital flows to countries, which have yet to  
FIGURE 1:  U.S. FED’S RESERVE MONEY, SEASONALLY ADJUSTED, 2008-2010 
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introduce  capital  controls.  They  also  distort  the 
allocation of financial resources.   
The Dangers of Protectionist Spirals 
The key danger in relaxing U.S. monetary policy is that it 
weakens the U.S. dollar, other things being equal. Even if 
unintended  (the  U.S.  government  confirms  its 
commitment to a strong dollar and rejects accusations 
of  intentional  currency  manipulation)  this  will  cause 
serious  turbulences  in  the  world  economy  and  may 
result in future political controversies within the G20.  
Currencies with floating exchange rates will appreciate, 
harming growth prospects of their respective countries 
and regions. This is a particularly serious challenge for 
stagnating or slow-growing high-income countries such 
as  Japan  and  most  of  the Euro  area.  Countries  which 
continue to peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar will 
not lose their trade competitiveness and may even gain 
a  short-term  advantage  in  relation  to  countries  with 
appreciating  currencies.  On  the  other  hand,  they  are 
more     exposed  to  inflationary  and  overheating 
consequences of a weak dollar.  
Ironically,  this  kind  of  asymmetric  adjustment  makes 
things worse from the point of view of rebalancing the 
world  economy,  which  seems  to  be  a  top  policy 
objective of the G20 and IMF. The countries which can 
be expected to reduce their current account surpluses 
such  as  China,  India,  or  oil-rich  economies  have  their 
currencies  pegged  to  the  U.S.  dollar.  Moreover,  a 
weaker dollar means further depreciation of their real 
effective  exchange  rates  (measured  against  a  trade-
weighted basket of transaction currencies) at least in the 
short-term. In the long-term higher imported inflation 
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The tensions generated by a weak dollar may easily lead to 
explicit trade protectionism in the form of higher tariff and 
non-tariff  barriers,  with  all  its  damaging  effects  as 
experienced  in  the  1930s.  In  the  short-run  the  increased 
volatility of exchange rates between major currencies also 
has an adverse impact on trade and financial sector stability, 
especially in economies with high foreign-currency exposure.  
True, emerging market economies with persistent trade and 
current account surpluses should allow their currencies to 
appreciate in nominal terms. This is important not only for 
reducing current account imbalances between major trading 
partners  and  regions  but  also  for  maintaining  domestic 
macroeconomic stability of emerging market economies (i.e. 
reducing  the  imported  inflationary  pressure)  without 
resorting to capital controls and increasing costs of domestic 
financial  intermediations  (for  example,  through  higher 
reserve  requirements).  Historical  experience  vastly 
demonstrates  limits  of  mercantilist  policies  and  their 
damaging impact on global trade.  
On  the  other  hand,  changing  exchange  rate  policy  in 
countries  such  as  China  or  India  is  a  politically  sensitive 
process and requires time. It requires not just the correction 
of the exchange rate or the exchange rate regime, but rather 
deeper  change  within  the  country’s  economic  growth 
strategy.  External  pressure,  especially  in  the  form  of 
unilateral  monetary  policy  decisions  of  central  banks  (like 
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